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Greece - Monitoring report

Date of the monitoring visit: from 16 to 17 September and from 18 to 20 November 2014
Report adopted on: 26 March 2015
Files : Report CG/2015(28)8 | Recommendation 372 (2015)
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This is the third report concerning the monitoring of local and regional democracy in Greece since the country ratified the Charter in 1989. The report notes the progress made by Greece since the last recommendation in 2008, in particular through the adoption of the “New Architecture for Self-Governance and Decentralisation – Kallikratis Program” that represents an important step towards a more decentralised territorial system, namely as regards the status of prefectures and the status of the 13 administrative regions that were regional branches of central government. In this context, the report underlines the importance of the Kallikratis reform which increased local competences, transparency and accountability of local authorities as well as the involvement of local and regional associations in the preparation of the Kallikratis reform.

 

The report stresses the necessity to extend the scope of the Charter to the second tier of local government (regions), by amending the existing legislation. The Government is invited to revise the legislation in order to confer statutory powers for local authorities and to ensure adequate concomitant financial resources to the transfer of competences to local authorities which they may dispose freely within the framework of their powers. The Congress also recommends that the existing regulations for insular and mountainous municipalities be urgently implemented and a special status be conferred on these areas, especially as concerns finances; that a special status be conferred on the municipality of Athens as capital city and that special provisions for metropolitan municipalities of Athens and Thessaloniki be introduced and implemented in practice. Finally, it invites the Government to sign and ratify, in the near future, the Additional Protocol to the European Charter of Local Self-Government on the right to participate in the affairs of a local authority (CETS No. 207)

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Article ratified Ratified with reservation Non ratified
Compliance Partial compliance Non compliance To be determined
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Article 2
Constitutional and legal foundation for local self government - Article ratified

The principle of local self government shall be recognised in domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution.

Consistently with the Greek tradition of centralisation, the principle of local self-government is not included among the “Basic Provisions” of Part One of the Constitution. Conversely, the principle can be found in Section VI of Part Three of the Constitution, in Chapter One “Organization of the Administration”, Articles 101 and 102 (Article 101A addresses a different matter, namely independent authorities). The location of the principle is the result of the view, well-rooted in the Greek tradition, according to which local authorities are considered part of the executive power. This view, however, is not always perfectly compatible with the principle of “local self-government” and in case of a future constitutional revision; the opportunity to include an entire section on self-government should be taken into account.

 

Article 101, paragraph 1, establishes the principle of “deconcentration” for the administration of the State: “1. The administration of the State shall be organised according to the principle of decentralisation.”

 

Article 102, in its actual text, following the 2001 revision, establishes in paragraph 1: “1. The administration of local affairs shall be exercised by local authorities of first and second level. For the administration of local affairs, there is a presumption of competence in favor of local authorities. The range and categories of local affairs, as well as their allocation to each level, shall be specified by law. Law may assign to local authorities the exercise of competences constituting mission of the State”. The notion of “local affairs” is not defined by the Constitution and it is a matter of legislation or of judicial interpretation.

 

Article 102, paragraph 2 points out that: “2. Local authorities shall enjoy administrative and financial autonomy”. Financial autonomy is more specifically regulated by paragraph 5: “5. The State shall adopt the legislative, regulatory and fiscal measures required for ensuring the financial independence and the funds necessary to the fulfilment of the mission and exercise of the competences of local authorities […] Every transfer of competences from central or regional administrations of the State to local government also entails the transfer of the corresponding funds”.

 

In comparison with most constitutions, especially the most recent ones, the constitutional regulation of local self-government in Greece is rather circumscribed and synthetic. In addition, also as a result of the 2001 (Article 102) and the 2008 (Article 101) amendments, the provisions are neither organic nor well-organised. Therefore, the remark contained in the 2008 Congress recommendation, at para 5b, according to which Article 102 does not identify the two levels of local authorities (consequently weakening their constitutional guarantee), still holds unfortunately true.

Article 3.1
Concept of local self government - Article ratified

Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population.

The main question that must be addressed under this heading is whether, in the present situation, Greek municipalities do regulate and manage a “substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population”. This provision requires an assessment which takes into account the rather “subjective” and relative nature of the concept of “a substantial share of public affairs”, since no official or universal method of measuring such substantial character has yet been developed. The question must be addressed considering the historical evolution, the culture and the constitutional traditions of the country under analysis.

 

In order to assess compliance with this provision, both legislative and factual aspects should be taken into consideration.

 

As for the legislation, a first problematic issue is the lack of statutory powers of municipalities, which cannot “regulate” local affairs. This aspect is part of the Greek longstanding and well-rooted tradition of centralisation and is enshrined in the Constitution itself. Actually, State competence (i.e. matters reserved to parliamentary law) for important subjects of public policy (education and health system, environmental protection, physical planning, economic development, etc.) is explicitly established by the Constitution (e.g. in Articles 21, 16, 24, 106), while local governments are deprived of regulatory autonomy. “This means” – according to the written answer provided by the Council of State in response to the questions raised by the rapporteurs – that “all strategic decisions regarding local authorities are taken at the level of National Parliament”.

 

This is also true as far as taxation is concerned. Article 78 of the Constitution safeguards the so called “taxation monopoly” of the parliament (whose plenary law defines subject, percentages and exemptions of taxation), whereas Article 102, para. 4 imposes correspondingly on the State the duty to “concern itself” to ensure the necessary resources for local authorities.

 

Statutory powers may be delegated by the Parliament to local authorities. This delegation is subject to the same rigid substantial and procedural rules that were drawn by the Constitution (Article 43) for any “organ of the executive function” (e.g. ministers, boards, etc.). This means that delegation of legislative power is allowed only by parliamentary act and only if it refers to “special matters” or “subjects of detailed or technical character or of local interest” (Article 43, para 2). Accordingly, case-law of the Greek Council of State underlined that local government competence for “local affairs” (Article 102, para. 1) refers only to single administrative acts and not to normative acts (local norms of general character), which are subject to the restrictions set out by Article 43, para. 2, just as they apply to any other organ of the executive function. Furthermore, the Council of State rejected the delegation of new responsibilities from the State to local government, every time these responsibilities refer to “important sectors of public policy”, which are assigned by the constitution exclusively to the state (e.g. physical planning, environmental protection, or the status of teachers in public schools).

 

After the 2001 constitutional revision, the new version of Article 102 of the Constitution, by establishing that “Law may assign to local government agencies the exercise of competences constituting mission of the State” tried to facilitate delegation of State responsibilities to local authorities (Article 75II of the Code of Municipalities and Communities 2006 (law 3463/2006) assigning to municipalities state responsibilities) but the Council of State has continued to oppose delegation to local authorities. Furthermore, according to the prevailing legal view, the law can change borders and types of local government authorities for reasons of public interest, following objective criteria. Discretion of ordinary law over territorial structure and organizational form of local government is quite broad, especially when the existing structures are considered inefficient. For this reason, the amalgamation reforms of 1997 and 2010 did not face any serious legal opposition.

 

Regarding factual aspects, during their visits in Greece the rapporteurs were told in several meetings with the associations of local authorities and with some municipalities, that, notwithstanding this legal framework, “no decentralisation exists in Greece” or that “the country is less decentralised now than it was before Kallikratis”.

 

Several problematic aspects have been pointed out that the rapporteurs would like to list here, as they can undermine the very concept of local self-government: a. Kallikratis reform transferred many new competences to municipalities; some of them, e.g. on social policies, are important in a time of economic crisis, but without adequate financial and human resources municipalities cannot manage them. This is especially true for municipalities that experienced important mergers and have a vast territory (such as Lagadàs, for instance, where the rapporteurs had a meeting during their visit. b. As a consequence of the Kallikratis reform, in many fields there is an overlapping of competences (and responsibilities) between deconcentrated State administration, regions and municipalities. Competences need to be reassessed; mechanisms of co-operation and dialogue between the different authorities do not work properly. It is especially unclear concerning the role of 7 State authorities that are becoming progressively weaker, also as a consequence of the empowerment of regions; these State authorities cannot be abolished without a constitutional revision since there are some matters that according to the constitution cannot be transferred to local government. Rapporteurs were told by different interlocutors (at both local and national level) that they should be abolished. c. A better, more institutionalized, co-ordination and consultation at any level is warranted, especially in areas with extensive overlapping of competences (such as education or transportation). d. Financial autonomy is a very complex issue, as the transfer of competences occurred without adequate resources. Since 2010, the State funds (CAF) were cut by 60%; interlocutors pointed out that cuts have been proportionally more extensive at local level than at State level. e. There is a growing difficulty in collecting local taxes due to the economic crisis: more than addressing local affairs in the interests of local population, the main concerns of mayors are to be able to pay to the administrative staff their salaries each month. f. All interlocutors, both at national and local level, agreed that local authorities should be able to make use of own resources, especially taxes, also in order to enhance accountability; the proposal to transfer all taxes on local estates to local government is welcomed. g. Many municipalities, especially those located in remote areas, face significant operational problems due to the large extension of their territory and the lack of sufficient resources. h. Especially problematic is the issue of human resources. Since 2010, municipalities have experienced important cuts in personnel. Concerns have arisen from both a quantitative - many municipalities are understaffed - and a qualitative perspective – others are overstaffed with non-expert staff and are in need of staff with higher expertise. The number of staff employed at every municipality seems to escape planning and be the result of mere personal choices (depending on the number of employees who decide to retire or to take advantage of the mobility programs), also in consideration of the fact that it is not possible to hire new staff until 2016 and that cuts have been made to temporary contracts. Most interlocutors agreed that this policy on contracts responds to the need to eliminate the pre-existing patronage system, but the result is a lack of seasonal staff, especially in touristic destinations. The new, centralised, system for the selection of personnel – currently not operational due to the crisis - was perceived as too lengthy. i. Even more simple measures adopted by the legislator within the framework of the public administration reform – such as the compulsory publication on the web of decisions of local governments, the program on transparency58 or the centralised system for public procurement59 turned out to be difficult to implement at local level due to the lack of well-trained staff, able to use new technologies. j. The right and the ability of local authorities to manage local affairs in the interests of their populations are also undermined by the overwhelming quantity of existing legal provisions. Legislations and regulations often go into great detail. Standards established long ago are still in force, only partially amended due to their progressive obsolescence, ultimately increasing the complexity of legislation and creating inefficient procedures. This legislative complexity often determines different decisions in similar cases, both at the level of administrative courts and at the Court of audit. k. Another important obstacle is represented by the extensive bureaucracy. The supervision on local government is especially complex. Very often legality control turns into an expediency control; as a consequence of the crisis, financial controls - on expenditures and budget – increased and the control by the Observatory is considered by local authorities as undermining their autonomy; l. There are several cases of dismissals of elected officials after a final decision of a court; they are very often prosecuted for no reasons, as a consequence of anonymous complaints.

 

To summarise, considering Greece’s past as a much centralised State, the reform introduced by Kallikratis was considered positively (a step in the right direction) by most interlocutors, both at central and local level. This is so, especially because Kallikratis increased local competences, transparency and accountability, all elements considered necessary to counteract the diffuse maladministration and corruption, especially common at local government level.60 Within this framework, also the ex-ante control over local budget is admitted by some interlocutors at local level; many sources considered that until the crisis local budgets were not accurately drafted, and in many instances were merely fictional; therefore, the Observatory can be seen just as a temporary tool in order to make the budgets realistic.

 

Nevertheless, the rapporteurs were told very often that the implementation of the reform has been deeply affected by the crisis. This explains the abovementioned statements (“there is no decentralisation in Greece” or that “the country is less decentralised now than it was before Kallikratis”). There is a diffuse perception that agreements with the Troika determined Greek politics at any level and that, by the time being, there is no possibility to properly implement the reform, or any other improvement in the local self-government. The interlocutors, not only at national level, but also at local level, share the view that local governments must contribute to the country’s recovery. How this can be accomplished, however, is still very much an open issue.

Article 3.2
Concept of local self government - Article ratified

This right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies composed of members freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage, and which may possess executive organs responsible to them. This provision shall in no way affect recourse to assemblies of citizens, referendums or any other form of direct citizen participation where it is permitted by statute.

The right to self-government is exercised in Greece by elected bodies: Article 102, para 2 of the Constitution provides that the institutions of local authorities (of first and second level) “shall be elected by universal and secret ballot, as specified by law”. At municipal level both the council and the mayor are freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage. The mayor, as mentioned before, is the executive organ and is not responsi­ble to the council. The electoral system, taken in conjunction with the fact that the mayor, elected for a five-year term, does not need the declared confidence of the majority of the municipal council (a quasi-presidential, non-parliamentarian system at the local level), determines a dominant role of directly elected mayors.

 

The Kallikratis reform tried to introduce in the organisational structure bodies that could counterbalance the power of the mayors. Among these, the following may be mentioned: 1.) the executive board, which is a kind of city cabinet that monitors and coordinates the implementation of municipal policies, 2.) the economic committee, which is responsible for financial planning and control as well as for public procurement, and 3.) the quality of life committee (in municipalities with more than 10 000 residents) which is responsible for environmental, city planning, and certain permitting matters.

 

In addition, new institutions were introduced as elements that should increase the accountability, transparency, and participation of the citizens in local issues and that were expected to upgrade local government performance. To this end, Kallikratis stipulated that local authorities are obliged to make all their decisions public on the internet, as a requirement for their validity.

 

The establishment of a local mediator in every municipality to support citizens is an attempt to reduce mismanagement and eliminate sources of corruption as this institution will examine relevant allegations. He is elected by 2/3 municipal council decision (an analogous mediator is provided at regional level). The local and regional mediators are responsible for protecting citizens and enterprises against municipal and regional acts of maladministration and from the maladministration of their legal entities and enterprises; they are also responsible for mediating in order to address relevant problems.

 

Α consultation committee should be created in municipalities with more than 10.000 residents as well as in municipalities with a population of less than 10.000 inhabitants, upon decision of the municipal council. It is composed of representatives of professional organisations, scientific entities and organisations, workers' and employers' organisations, cultural and sports organisations, civil society organisations, registered municipal residents, etc. It acts as an advisory body on various issues of local interest and offers advice to the municipal council (a similar organ is set up at the regional level providing advice on issues of regional interest).

Article 4.1
Scope of local self government - Article ratified

The basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be prescribed by the constitution or by statute. However, this provision shall not prevent the attribution to local authorities of powers and responsibilities for specific purposes in accordance with the law.

The Greek Constitution regulates the scope of local self-government in Article 102, para. 1. After establishing that: “The administration of local affairs shall be exercised by local government agencies of first and second level”, it provides that “For the administration of local affairs, there is a presumption of competence in favor of local authorities”, accepting the principle of Article 4, paragraph 3 of the Charter. The same Article 102, para. 1 adds that “The range and categories of local affairs, as well as their allocation to each level, shall be specified by law”. Therefore, it is the law that determines the competences of local authorities and especially the Municipal code of 2006 (Law 3463/2006, art. 75). The Municipal code has been deeply amended by Kallikratis reform and at the moment a new code is under elaboration.

 

The rapporteurs were informed by the representatives of the Greek Parliament that in 2013, due to the strict limitations on the budget set by the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy 2013-2016, the government was forced to suspend the transfer of a number of significant powers to local government authorities (Law 4147/2013). However, it is the government’s intention to proceed with the full implementation of the “Kallikratis” Program as soon as the fiscal situation permits it.

 

Accordingly, Article 4, para. 1 of the Charter that establishes that “The basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be prescribed by the Constitution or by statute”, should be considered formally respected, although in the practice the transfer of the new competences has not yet been completed. In addition, it should be noted that, in practice, not only major, but also sometimes even minor decisions tend to be taken at the highest administrative or political level. Some of the most important public service delivery systems, such as public education, public health services, and social protection are still subject to direct and comprehensive control by the central government. 

 

The consequence of the Greek tradition of centralisation and the existing legal and factual framework are not in line with full discretion (Article 4, para. 2 of the Charter) and to the fullness, comprehensiveness and exclusiveness of responsibilities (Article 4, para. 4 of the Charter) as stipulated in the Charter . It is sufficient to mention the role played by the deconcentrated State administration. While in some countries it is considered that it is not necessary for the government to set up its own field offices, the prevailing view in Greece argues that the implementation of major government policies and their adaptation to local circumstances should be entrusted to deconcentrated state administrations, thus safeguarding an unbroken line of unitary political responsibility and control through the central government that is trusted by the national parliament.

 

However, regions have no legal authority to regulate, control or simply exercise influence over the first tier of local government, the municipalities. In fact, regions often co-operate with municipalities and often offer resources and assistance to municipalities but the law explicitly states that there is no subordination or any form of “hierarchical relation” between municipalities and regions. From this point of view, art. 4, para. 4 of the Charter is respected.

 

As for Article 4, para 5 of the Charter, it should be pointed out that Article 102, para 1 of the Constitution provides also that “Law may assign to local authorities the exercise of competences constituting mission of the State”, although in many fields, as pointed out above, the delegation of powers to local authorities is still not admitted by the case-law of the Council of State. When delegation is possible, it is regulated in the framework of Article 43 of the Constitution, as any delegation in favor of “organs of the executive function”: thus the space of discretion left to local authorities is narrow.

 

Finally, Article 4 para. 6 of the Charter provides that “local authori­ties shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decision‑making processes for all matters which concern them directly”. This issue was addressed in Recommendation 247 (2008), according to which the Greek authorities responsible for local and regional self-government have to “consult both levels of local authorities as broadly as possible, taking account of their interests, when preparing and introducing the reform”. As a matter of fact, rapporteurs were told that local authorities’ representatives (by now KEDE for municipalities and ENPE for regions, see infra) were deeply involved in the preparation of Kallikratis reform.

 

From a legal point of view, there is no constitutionally-established process of consultation between central and local government. However, some interlocutors told the rapporteurs that the Ministry of the Interior is in constant communication with local government representatives and always consults with them before taking any legislative initiatives. Regarding the Parliament, its members are informed through the Special Standing Committee on the Regions on the functioning of local government authorities, particularly on the issues concerning the design and implementation of regional development policy. They also consult with local government representatives in committee hearings when matters concerning them are discussed in Parliament.

 

The case-law of the Council of State has established that for every transfer of powers from central or regional authorities to local authorities and for the allocation of the local affairs to the different levels of decentralisation, it is necessary to acquire the opinion of the local authority in question, before the transfer of powers.

 

In conclusion, four basic remarks may be formulated in respect of the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter:

 

On the one hand, the number and importance of powers and competences presently enjoyed by municipalities do not seem too limited. In addition to the competences already listed in the previous legislation, Kallikratis reform transferred many new competences to municipalities. The main concern is the lack of adequate financial and human resources to adequately manage them.

 

On the other hand, fullness, comprehensiveness and exclusiveness of responsibilities seem not be respected. In many fields there is an overlapping of competences (and responsibilities) between deconcentrated State administration, regions, and municipalities. The role of 7 de-concentrated State authorities is especially controversial. Rapporteurs were told by different interlocutors (not only at local level, but also at national level) that they should be abolished.

 

In order to avoid overlapping responsibilities, it should also be considered that there are many matters in which competences can be neither transferred nor delegated to local authorities, due to the wording of the Constitution and to the interpretation given by the Council of State.

 

Finally, more institutionalised co-ordination and consultation processes at any level are needed, especially in areas with huge overlapping of competences (such as education or transportation).

Article 4.2
Scope of local self government - Article ratified

Local authorities shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise their initiative with regard to any matter which is not excluded from their competence nor assigned to any other authority.

Consult reply indicated at article 4.1

Article 4.3
Scope of local self government - Article ratified

Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy.

Consult reply indicated at article 4.1

Article 4.4
Scope of local self government - Article ratified

Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive. They may not be undermined or limited by another, central or regional, authority except as provided for by the law.

Consult reply indicated at article 4.1

Article 4.5
Scope of local self government - Article ratified

Where powers are delegated to them by a central or regional authority, local authorities shall, insofar as possible, be allowed discretion in adapting their exercise to local conditions.

 

Consult reply indicated at article 4.1

Article 4.6
Scope of local self government - Article ratified

Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decision-making processes for all matters which concern them directly.

 

Consult reply indicated at article 4.1

Article 5
Protection of local authority boundaries - Non ratified

Changes in local authority boundaries shall not be made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted by statute.

 

Greece is not bound by article 5, according to which local authority boundaries should not be changed without prior consultation with the local communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum where this is permitted by statute. This being said, the rapporteurs would like to stress that the process of mergers of municipalities has been a prominent feature in the Greek territorial landscape in the last decades, especially in the “Kapodistrias” and “Kallikratis” reform. Changes to administrative boundaries of a municipality may take place under certain conditions provided for in articles 2-5 and 10-13 of the Law 3463/2006 (“Code of Municipalities and Communities”) and article 5 (“Redefinition of boundaries of municipal communities within municipalities of over 100 000 inhabitants, transfer of a local community to a neighbouring municipality”), as well as article 6 of the Law 3852/2010 (“the Kallikratis reform”) (“Establishment of a local community from a settlement which is defined in the census as independent”). The opinion of the local authorities involved is requested. The holding of local referendums is enshrined in article 216 of the Law 3463/2006; however the presidential decree necessary to implement this provision is still lacking and therefore, referendums have not, in practice, been held. Therefore the rapporteurs are of the opinion that the situation in Greece would be, de jure at least, in compliance with Article 5. Consequently, they consider that very little is required to enable ratification of Article 5 of the Charter and they encourage the Greek authorities to consider revisiting the declaration made as regards this article.

Article 6.1
Appropriate administrative structures and resources for the tasks of local authorities - Article ratified

Without prejudice to more general statutory provisions, local authorities shall be able to determine their own internal administrative structures in order to adapt them to local needs and ensure effective management.

Article 6, para 1 of the Charter provides that local authorities shall be able to determine their own internal administrative structure. Greek municipalities enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in establishing their internal organisation charts, although it should be considered that they lack statutory powers and that the laws regulate in detail the municipal organisation.

Article 6.2
Appropriate administrative structures and resources for the tasks of local authorities - Article ratified

The conditions of service of local government employees shall be such as to permit the recruitment of high-quality staff on the basis of merit and competence; to this end adequate training opportunities, remuneration and career prospects shall be provided.

As regards Article 6, para. 2, of the Charter, on the recruitment of staff, this is presently a very controversial issue in Greece, also as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis and the measures imposed to address it.

 

The public service system in Greece is a career system: officers are recruited at the base of a pyramid and advance progressively to higher posts. The current constitutional status for civil servants is also applied to employees of local self-government authorities (Article 103, para. 6 of the Constitution). Civil servants have tenure and they have an obligation of political neutrality. The whole formal status of local authorities’ staff, although governed by a special code, is assimilated in its major aspects to that of the staff of the state public service, although the administration units of local government authorities have many special profiles and, usually, a smaller size.

 

Article 103, para. 2 of the Constitution establishes that personnel with the status of civil servants (so called “permanent personnel”) can only be hired if a corresponding post is provided in the organisation chart (“organigram”) of the local authority. “Long-term private law employees” can only be hired as “special scientific” or “technical” or “assistant” personnel. Short-term employment according to private law is only allowed in view of “unexpected” or “urgent” needs.

 

Since the constitutional revision of 2001, control of an independent regulatory authority (the High Council for the Selection of Personnel, known under the acronym 'ASEP') over hiring and contracting of all kinds of personnel in the whole public sector – already introduced in 1994 – is being constitutionally guaranteed. Although this means that respective hiring and contracting procedures can require a long lead time, this centralised system has been deemed necessary in order to terminate traditional patronage practices that frustrated meritocracy and overloaded public administration with high numbers of personnel that lacked the necessary skills, while it undermined professionalism and ethics of public servants. Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly prohibited the adoption of laws that would turn temporary employment into any kind of permanent employment, since several laws, in the past, used to “legalize” ex post a plethora of patronage practices that circumvented constitutional provisions on hiring and employment status in the public sector.

 

Apart from rigid legal restrictions concerning recruitment, local government has practically no possibility to develop a human resources management system of its own. Negotiations between employees and employers are organised nationally, given that salary increases and other claims are settled at the level of central government. In the case of local government, although the employer is the authority concerned, bargaining is conducted with the central government (especially the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance).

 

As for the quality of the staff, an important role in improving the capacities of local government employees is played by the National Centre for Public Administration & Local Government (EKDDA). It is the strategic agency of Greece for the development of the public administration and local government human resources. It was founded back in 1983 as a Public Law Entity with administrative and financial autonomy and is supervised directly by the Minister of Administrative Reform & e-Governance.

 

For budgetary reasons, restrictive measures on hiring of public sector personnel have been introduced by the beginning of the eighties, while nowadays, due to financial crisis and consequent conditionality, they have been further tightened. Since 2010 several exceptional measures have been taken in order to cut the cost of local government staff, as for the overall public administration employees, such Article 11 of Law 3833/2010, which defined that the number of annual recruitments and hiring could not be higher than the ratio of 1:5 (one recruitment per five exits) for all the entities and the provision contained in 2013-2016 MTFS of reduced recruitments under the rule 1:10. Another important aspect was the cuts in public sector seasonal bonus and in wages. New laws ordered internal re-organisation of local authorities: in 2011 new and “lean” organisational charts were adopted, in 2012 municipalities and regions had to abolish existing vacancies (posts without staff), in 2013 internal units (directorates, departments, offices etc.) had to be reduced by 30%. Employees on contract basis (without civil servant status) have been fired (ca. 30,000, 1/5 of local government employees in total in 2011). Employment contracts should be reduced, in 2012 only 4,477 contracts were approved, in 2013 the number was reduced to 3,582, further reducing is foreseen for 2014 (-20%) and 2015-2016 (-10%). Even employees with civil servant status (3,500 municipal policemen and 2,200 school guardians) were removed from their offices in 2013.

 

According to the 2015-1018 MTFS, the process of appointing and recruiting permanent staff and staff with private law contracts of indefinite duration of secondary and compulsory education, for first and second degree local authorities and their legal entities under private law, is suspended until 31 December 2016. Local authorities may appoint and recruit regular staff (university and technical education) within the limitations set by the provisions of article 11 of Law 3833/2010 as applicable, according to which, a decision by the Minister of Administrative Reform and e- Government is needed for implementing the ratio 1:5.

 

It should be noted that the planning of recruitments for first and second level local government staff falls within the public sector staff planning, under the jurisdiction of the MAREG, which is responsible for keeping the relevant data. Finally, Article 30 of Law 4223/2013, as amended and applicable (article 51, par 8 of Law 4250/2014) provides for the program of voluntary mobility within the two levels of local government, according to which staff from first degree local authorities may upon their request, be transferred to first and second degree local authorities.

 

In conclusion, at the moment Greek municipalities lack the possibility to recruit high‑quality staff on the basis of merit and competence, according to Article 6, para. 2. Many interlocutors pointed out that local authorities (as well as the rest of Greek public administrations) have been over-staffed with unqualified people hired in the past. However, nowadays most municipalities deal with an important lack of specialized staff. Rapporteurs cannot avoid to point out that this weakness on human resources is likely to undermine the local authorities’ ability to manage their competences and, in substance, the very scope of local self-government.

Article 7.1
Conditions under which responsibilities at local level are exercised - Article ratified

The conditions of office of local elected representatives shall provide for free exercise of their functions.

As for Article 7, para 1 of the Charter, under Greek law, the conditions of office of local elected representatives do provide for the free exercise of their functions. This point has never been put into question by facts or reality, although in the recent years the financial crisis determined an important cut in remuneration of elected representatives (e.g. only the mayor and one or two deputy mayors, depending on the size of the municipality, are remunerated; the amount of the remuneration has been reduced; municipal councillors do not receive any payment or allowance).

 

Mayors, deputy mayors, and the presidents of the municipal councils who are employed as civil servants, public entities employees or state private legal entities or business employees are entitled to unpaid mandatory special leave throughout their term of office. No such possibilities of unpaid leave exist for private employees being councilors, nor allowances for councils meetings are provided.

 

Mayors or their relatives whose private interests come into conflict with municipal interests are required to abstain; in this case their powers are exercised by the deputy mayor. As a part of the transparency program carried out in the framework of Kallikratis, mayors, deputy mayors, all members of the economic committee and the quality of life committee are required to submit an annual statement of their assets and post it on the municipal website.

 

Article 7.2
Conditions under which responsibilities at local level are exercised - Non ratified

They shall allow for appropriate financial compensation for expenses incurred in the exercise of the office in question as well as, where appropriate, compensation for loss of earnings or remuneration for work done and corresponding social welfare protection.

Although Greece is not bound by paragraph 2 of Article 7, rapporteurs would like to point out the risk that important cuts in remuneration of elected representatives, if brought to extremes, may prevent some categories from standing for office and, in the end, undermine the free exercise of their functions.

Article 7.3
Conditions under which responsibilities at local level are exercised - Article ratified

Any functions and activities which are deemed incompatible with the holding of local elective office shall be determined by statute or fundamental legal principles.

As for Article 7, para 3, objective criteria of incompatibility are provided by the law. In order to safeguard public interests, judicial and religious officers, armed forces and security forces officers as well as any person having any relation with the municipal authorities, or any debt or owing money to the municipality may not stand for the offices of mayor, deputy mayor or member of the municipal council. Standing for elections at both levels of local government is prohibited. Any election of the same person as an elected representative of the first and second level local government is precluded. Rapporteurs were told that a prohibition existed between the office of mayor and the practice as a lawyer that could prevent lawyers from engaging in local democracy, but that eventually that prohibition was lifted. 

Article 8.1
Administrative supervision of local authorities' activities - Article ratified

Any administrative supervision of local authorities may only be exercised according to such procedures and in such cases as are provided for by the constitution or by statute.

Article 8 of the Charter deals with supervision of local authorities’ activities by other levels of government. Greece is not bound by paragraph 2 of this article. However, the expediency control (to which paragraph 2 refers to) is not contemplated by the Greek legal system. Following the 2001 constitutional revision, Article 102, para. 4 of the Constitution explicitly refers to “the review of legality” and provides that State supervision “shall not be allowed to impede” the “initiative and freedom of action” of local authorities. Legislation has been amended accordingly.

 

In the past (as observed by Recommendation 247 (2008)) one of the most problematic issues of local and regional democracy in Greece was the role of the Secretary General of the deconcentrated State administration vis-à-vis the local authorities. The Recommendation considered that it “infringes the principle of local self-government, particularly owing to the administrative interventions which this office is allowed to make in the settlement of local affairs, that is, in the field of planning and management of community funds and the powers of admin­istrative and financial control and surveillance of both levels of local authorities”.

 

The rapporteurs notice with satisfaction that important progress has been made by Kallikratis reform, as a completely new system of legality supervision has been introduced (described above), although the system has not been fully implemented yet and Greece is still in a transition period, in which the previous system is still in place. During the monitoring visits, rapporteurs were told by several representatives of local authorities that many difficulties still exist, as the State’s supervision of local government is still extensive.

 

In practice, control procedures are lengthy, also due to the weakness and lack of human resources in State deconcentrated administrations, determining, especially in the numerous cases of ex ante compulsory control, a paralysis of the local administrative action and, in some cases, a denial of citizens’ rights.

 

The Greek Ombudsman, in his written answers to the rapporteur’s questions, pointed out that maladministration, which often characterises local government authorities, is due, to a great extent, to the unwillingness or weakness of the deconcentrated State administration in monitoring practices, to ensure legality and transparency. The investigation of the complaints submitted to the Greek Ombudsman has revealed incapacity on the part of the Secretary of deconcentrated administration to review citizens’ complaints within the required 60 day absolute deadlines from the submission’s date. If there is no action on the part of the deconcentrated administration the complaint is overruled implicitly.

 

Furthermore, very often legality control shifts towards expediency control. Examples were provided of cases in which State control voids the local autonomy, leaving no discretion to municipalities, also in matters relevant to their competence.

 

Another important concern expressed by local authorities is in relation to the financial controls introduced as consequence of financial crisis, and especially in relation to the creation of an observatory for local government’s fiscal management (the official title was “Observatory of financial autonomy of Local Authorities”, hereafter “Observatory”).

 

The Observatory was firstly established in 2012, by the new mid-term framework for fiscal strategy (MTFS) and it has been launched through Law 4111/2013 (Article 4). It is a Committee supported by the Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Interior and consisting of Fiscal Judges and high civil servants, while it also includes representatives of Local Government Associations (from the first and, respectively, the second tier). Law 4270/2014 (“Fiscal management and supervision principles, incorporation of directive 2011/85/EU - Public accounting and other provisions”) redefined the tasks of the Observatory. 

 

The main role of the Observatory – according to the MTFS 2015-2018 – is to ensure the preparation of realistic and balanced budgets by local authorities, in accordance with the applicable budgetary Law as well as the monthly monitoring of budget execution by local authorities and their legal entities included in the Register of General Government Entities. Moreover, the Observatory provides its opinion to the Ministers of Interior and Finance on the draft budgets, by drawing up proposals, which are taken into consideration in the preparation of the consolidated local government budget that is reflected in the MTFS and the State Budget. 

 

In the above mentioned context, the Observatory: a. Assesses the revenue forecasts presented by local authorities in their budgets and the Integrated Action Plan and draws up proposals concerning the modification of targets, mainly when revenues appear to be overestimated and unrealistic; b. Assesses and controls the proper budget implementation, and in case of deviation greater than 10% from the quarterly budgetary objectives, it informs the local authority involved and its supervising authority and provides guidance on correcting the deviation. In the case of deviation from the targets for two consecutive quarters and if no appropriate measures have been taken, by decision of the Minister of Interior issued upon a proposal of the Observatory, the local authority concerned is placed under the fiscal consolidation program. The Observatory is responsible for defining the way of implementation of the programme. 

 

According to the experts’ opinion, up to now, however, no such case has been recorded yet. Even in cases of persistent budget variance, the Observatory tends to apply “soft” methods of persuasion. Mandatory opinions of the Observatory on several matters and occasions have been submitted to all entities (893 in total), sometimes even containing instructions for draft budgets of 2014. Corrective mechanisms to control the budget execution for annual targets had already been introduced in 2012, however, such mechanisms proved not to be useful to the full extent if ceilings are not used in the budgetary process over time. In its comments sent to the rapporteurs during the consultation process, the Minister of Interior stressed that the opinions of the Observatory concern the drawing up of the annual budgets and focus on checks related to realistic budget drawings. Compliance with the directives and the ceilings, provided for in the annual Joint Ministerial Decision on the preparation of the budget issued by the Ministers of Finance and of Interior, is the essential tool for evaluating the realistic aspect of local budgets. In case of deviation in the execution of the budgets, the Observatory gives instructions to the entities that deviate so that they carry out actions with a view to correcting the deviations.

 

In 2013, Local Authorities’ budgets were not fully consistent with the projections of the MTFS for the local government sector as a whole. Consistency between the MTFS projections and Local Governments' budgets of 2014 became obviously more effective through the cooperation between the Observatory from one side and local government from the other side.

 

Institutionalisation of such an “Observatory” and other mechanisms of central fiscal control including obligatory measures faced vehement opposition from local government associations as well as from trade unions of local government employees. National Associations of Local Governments appealed in Council of the State against acts of the Observatory. They claimed this Institution would violate constitutional safeguards and especially the provisions on operational and economic autonomy of local government authorities (Article 102 para 2 of the Constitution).

 

The Council of State decided that legal provisions about the Observatory would not violate the financial autonomy of local government. The new institution would restrain in guidelines and instructions while municipal and regional councils still have enough space of discretion. Furthermore, the court stated that fiscal targets imposed by international agreements of the Greek government with the Troika and the European partners would be directly binding for all entities of general government

 

In conclusion, as for the compliance with Article 8, paras. 1 and 3, rapporteurs are perfectly aware that in the Greek context after 2010 – deeply marked by the financial crisis and by the subsequent international conditionality – a certain degree of centralised supervision, especially budgetary, over local government cannot be avoided. In addition, they were told by most interlocutors, not only at State level (such as the President of the Observatory or the representatives of the Minister of Finance) but also at municipal level, that some degree of budgetary control was needed, due to the long-established and very common practice for Greek local authorities to present inaccurate provisional budgets.

 

The rapporteurs highly appreciate the efforts made by Greece, since the 2008 recommendation, in modifying the administrative supervision system. However, they cannot avoid expressing their concern about the existing situation: the lack of full implementation of the new system of legality supervision; the excessive length and bureaucratisation of procedures; the tendency of the legality control to shift to expediency control. Especially delicate is the role of the Observatory, given the risk that its control is not kept in proportion to the importance of the public interests which it is intended to protect and that it undermines the local financial autonomy and especially the freedom of local authorities to determinate expenditures priorities (in relation to Article 9, para. 1, of the Charter, see infra).

 

So far, it seems to the rapporteurs that the actual situation in Greece is not in compliance with the requirements laid down in article 8, paras. 1 and 3 of the Charter and those factual developments should be further monitored.

Article 8.2
Administrative supervision of local authorities' activities - Non ratified

Any administrative supervision of the activities of the local authorities shall normally aim only at ensuring compliance with the law and with constitutional principles. Administrative supervision may however be exercised with regard to expediency by higher-level authorities in respect of tasks the execution of which is delegated to local authorities.

Article 8.3
Administrative supervision of local authorities' activities - Article ratified

Administrative supervision of local authorities shall be exercised in such a way as to ensure that the intervention of the controlling authority is kept in proportion to the importance of the interests which it is intended to protect.

Consult reply indicated at article 8.1

Article 9.2
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

Local authorities' financial resources shall be commensurate with the responsibilities provided for by the constitution and the law.

Consult reply indicated at article 9.1

Article 9.8
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

For the purpose of borrowing for capital investment, local authorities shall have access to the national capital market within the limits of the law.

Consult reply indicated at article 9.1

Article 9.7
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction.

Consult reply indicated at article 9.1

Article 9.6
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

Local authorities shall be consulted, in an appropriate manner, on the way in which redistributed resources are to be allocated to them.

Consult reply indicated at article 9.1

Article 9.5
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

The protection of financially weaker local authorities calls for the institution of financial equalisation procedures or equivalent measures which are designed to correct the effects of the unequal distribution of potential sources of finance and of the financial burden they must support. Such procedures or measures shall not diminish the discretion local authorities may exercise within their own sphere of responsibility.

Consult reply indicated at article 9.1

Article 9.3
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

Part at least of the financial resources of local authorities shall derive from local taxes and charges of which, within the limits of statute, they have the power to determine the rate.

Consult reply indicated at article 9.1

Article 9.1
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

Local authorities shall be entitled, within national economic policy, to adequate financial resources of their own, of which they may dispose freely within the framework of their powers.

The legal authority to perform certain functions is meaningless if local authorities are deprived of the financial resources to carry them out. The financial resources of local authorities are a sensitive topic and an important source of controversy in many countries, but this issue is especially delicate in Greece.

 

It was already addressed by Recommendation 247 (2008), according to which “the financing of the municipalities and communities remains most inadequate; it is based almost exclusively on transfers from the state”. It was recommended that the Greek authorities responsible for local and regional self-government: “c. guide the evolution of the financial system towards more extensive diversification of sources of local government revenue, as directed in Article 9, paragraph 4 of the charter, by developing the foundations of greater financial auton­omy through levying of local revenue (dues and charges, borrowings and direct taxation); d. reinforce the system of local financing, in accordance with Article 9 (paragraphs 1 and 2) of the Charter, in the framework of devolution and transfer of powers to local authorities, looking to a larger proportion of local govern­ment funding in the GDP (gross domestic product) and in overall public spending”.

 

Local government revenues and expenditures are very low in Greece, as a percentage of GDP. The taxation autonomy of both tiers remains limited. Their total share of public expenditure is one of the lowest in Europe. More specifically, the two tiers of local government expenditure amounted to 2.8% of GDP in 2011 and 5.6% of total public expenditure. Local government revenue reached 2.6% of GDP and 5.6% of total public sector revenue in 2011.

 

The already existing difficulties increased in the recent years. From one hand, Kallikratis reform improved the competences of local authorities that subsequently would need more financial resources; from the other hand, the unprecedented financial crisis and the related Memoranda of Understanding imposed severe austerity measures and important budgetary cuts throughout the public sector.

 

The economic crisis had very heavy repercussions on the situation of local government in Greece. Rapporteurs were told that local and regional authorities have to “offer much more with much less”. General grants (CAF) decreased no less than 60% within 5 years. At the same time, municipalities faced increased claims for childcare, elderly care and especially for social assistance to jobless and poor people. Many municipalities proved to be very innovative, initiating “time banks” (service offers in exchange for other services), “social supermarkets”, “social drugstores” etc. At the same time, there were obvious efforts of the State and especially of the Ministry of Finance to control and coordinate financial management in municipalities, as showed above (sub art. 8).

 

In the written answer to the rapporteurs’ questions, the Ministry of Finance pointed out that the local government balance has improved significantly in recent years. This improvement is illustrated in fiscal outturn figures published by the ELSTAT. The high surpluses should be considered sustainable as also projected in the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2015-2018. It pointed out that due to the economic adjustment program, several measures were taken place in order to improve the financial situation of local authorities. Some of the measures aimed at improving own revenue such as increase in local tax compliance through the introduction of local tax clearance certificate requirement and increase other revenue due to economies of scale and better organization of collection mechanism while others targeted at the rationalization of expenses (e.g. introduction of electronic public procurement system, reduction in the cost of land expropriations, reduction in the number of fixed term contracts, cuts in public sector seasonal bonus, reduction in the number of advisors' positions of elected officials, flat rate for Chairmen and Managing Directors of Municipal Enterprises etc).

 

Moreover, despite the austerity measures which resulted in the reduction of Central Autonomous Funds (CAF), local authorities managed to successfully implement the aforementioned interventions and, therefore, contribute to the financial effort of the country mainly through the maintenance of own revenue (fees and royalties, income taxes, other fees and services, etc.) to high levels despite the economic recession and further rationalisation of operating costs. It should be noted that a key factor in achieving a positive balance for 2013 was the financing from the state budget to pay off outstanding obligations from the special appropriation of arrears clearance program.

 

The MTFS 2015-2018 points out that “The financial result improved in 2013 compared to 2012 and the most significant reasons are the maintenance of their own revenues at high levels despite the economic downturn, and the further rationalisation of their operating costs, which were decreased by approximately 12% compared to 2012. A crucial factor in achieving a positive balance in 2013 was the funding (about 933 million € cumulatively for 2012-2013) from the special allocation, of the State budget, to clear pre 2011 arrears”.

 

Notwithstanding, the rapporteurs cannot consider art. 9, para. 1 of the Charter respected in Greece: presently, local authorities do not dispose of “adequate financial resources of their own, of which they may dispose freely”. In practice, decision-making and especially implementation of policies often depend on resources controlled by the State and not by local authorities.

 

As for Article 9, para. 2 of the Charter, the principle of commensurability (according to which there should be an adequate relationship between the financial resources available to a local authority and the tasks it performs) has been violated since several additional responsibilities have been transferred to municipalities without the corresponding resources, as highest administrative court already acknowledged in more cases.

 

Paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the Charter requires that a proportion of local revenues should come from local taxes, and local governments must be able to determine the rate applicable. Paragraph 4 establishes the principle of diversification of financial resources of local authorities, while paragraph 5 establishes the principle of financial equalisation. Paragraph 6 provides for the necessity of proper consultation, paragraph 7 limits the special grants to local authorities and paragraph 8 disposes the access to the national capital market for local authorities.

 

On those issues, rapporteurs point out that, according to the data provided by the written answer of the Ministry of Finance, (quoting the fiscal outturn figures published by the ELSTAT for 2013), local government revenues’ structure is as follows: Grants from Ordinary Budget : 45% of total revenues Grants from Program Investment Budget: 11% of total revenues Other Revenues: 34% of total revenues (of which (a) revenues from reciprocal duties and rights: 15%, (b) tax revenues, duties, rights & services 7%, (c) other own revenues 6%, (d) revenues related to previous years 6%) Revenues collected on behalf of third parties : 10% of total revenues

 

The Local Government expenditure structure is described below: Personnel Remuneration: 25% of total expenditures Welfare benefits: 12% of total expenditures Interest Expenditure: 1% of total expenditures Program Investment Budget Expenditures: 17% of total expenditures Other Expenditures: 33% of total expenditures (of which (a) Payments related to previous years: 5%, (b) Transfers to third parties 10%, (c) Other operating expenditure 18% ) Expenditures on behalf of third parties:12% of total expenditures.

 

As described before, local authorities’ other revenues (e.g. excluding grants from State Budget & PIB) which represent approximately the 34% of total revenues are divided in 4 main categories: a. Revenues from reciprocal duties and rights: 47% of own revenues in 2013 b. Tax revenues, duties, rights & services: 22% of own revenues in 2013 c. Other own revenues: 13% of own revenues in 2013 d. Revenues related to previous years: 18% of own revenues in 2013 It must be noted that the share of the first three categories (a+b+c) is higher if we take into account amounts that refer to taxes, duties, rights, etc. but are related to previous years and are depicted in the fourth category.

 

Regarding the ability of Local Authorities to independently determine the burden of local taxes, the Ministry of Finance pointed out the following: Reciprocal duties are determined according to the cost of the offered service. The amount is approved by the City Council and the Secretary General of the Deconcentrated Administration The burden of other local taxes is provided by law and is not at the discretion of each Local Authority to alter.

 

Finally, the Ministry of Finance determines the total amount of statutory funds (Central Autonomous Funds (CAF)) as well as special grants given to Local Authorities taking into account the performance of specific taxes (e.g. VAT, CIT, ENFIA) and specific needs and events (e.g. economic recession, growing number of responsibilities). The redistribution and allocation of the aforementioned amounts are Ministry of Interior’s responsibility and are decided based on quantitative and qualitative criteria such as population, unemployment, growth, etc.

 

Other information on local financial resources has been provided, from a completely different point of view, by the Greek Ombudsman. According to Greek Ombudsman’s data the most common complaints concerning to the department of State-citizens relations and related to the first tier of local administration are the financial problems arising from the imposition of the local taxation. In addition the inefficient tax collecting affects the economic self-sufficiency of local government and their ability to fulfil their contractual or other obligations.

 

According to its experience the Ombudsman has come to the conclusion that local authorities are not sufficiently prepared to impose local taxation or, to be more specific, unable to implement the complex and -in many cases- outdated legislation.

 

Another serious problem is the inability of local government authorities to honour their financial obligations. The citizens often submit complaints because municipal authorities do not recognize their predecessors’ debts. Generally, local authorities refuse to fulfil their economic obligations arising either from the conditions of contracts or the rules of the relevant laws. Payment on time of the compensation for the expropriation of private property for urban planning processes is rare and many citizens ask for the Greek Ombudsman’s mediation.

 

Against this background, rapporteurs are fully aware of the unprecedented financial crisis and of the international constraints Greek authorities have to comply with. As important actors of the country, local authorities need to contribute to the consolidation process.

 

Nevertheless, rapporteurs believe that the economic and financial emergency cannot determine a suspension of the binding nature of the Charter. Thus, they should reaffirm, taking into consideration Recommendation 247 (2008), that the financing of the local authorities remains inadequate, as is based almost exclusively on transfers from the State.

 

The evolution of the financial system towards more extensive diversification of sources of local government revenue, as directed in Article 9, para. 4 of the Charter, by developing the foundations of greater financial auton­omy through levying of local revenue (dues and charges, borrowings and direct taxation) is still missing.

 

The need to reinforce the system of local financing, in accordance with Article 9 (paragraphs 1 and 2) of the Charter, in the framework of devolution and transfer of powers to local authorities, looking to a larger proportion of local government funding in the GDP (gross domestic product) and in overall public spending is still current.

 

The rapporteurs believe that a real local democracy needs strong local and regional government disposing of more own resources and discretion to decide upon them. During the monitoring visit, rapporteurs found a vast consensus on the possibility that revenue from real estate taxation would be transferred to municipalities and regions, which would thus become less dependent on State grants, improving the level of tax collection and increasing their accountability to the citizens. Thus, rapporteurs invite the Greek authorities to seriously consider this possibility, already in place in many countries of the Council of Europe having a long and well-rooted history of strong and effective local self-government.

Article 9.4
Financial resources of local authorities - Article ratified

The financial systems on which resources available to local authorities are based shall be of a sufficiently diversified and buoyant nature to enable them to keep pace as far as practically possible with the real evolution of the cost of carrying out their tasks.

Consult reply indicated at article 9.1

Article 10.1
Local authorities' right to associate - Article ratified

Local authorities shall be entitled, in exercising their powers, to co-operate and, within the framework of the law, to form consortia with other local authorities in order to carry out tasks of common interest.

In relation to Article 10, para 1 of the Charter, it should be pointed out that Article 102, para 3 of Greek Constitution establishes, after the 2001 constitutional revision, that “Law may provide for compulsory or voluntary associations of local authorities to execute works or render services or exercise competences belonging to local authorities; these shall be governed by elected administrations”. Co-operation across levels of local government (municipal and regional), as well as inter-municipal co-operation are being regulated and encouraged by law.

 

Co-operation including both tiers of local government is nowadays explicitly foreseen by law, that provides the (voluntary) establishment of cross-level “associations” (“diavathmidiki sindesmi”, Article 105 Kallikratis), which can deal with public works, service provision, fulfillment of concrete tasks or implementation of development programs and projects. Especially within the Attikia Region, an obligatory special cross-level “association” is provided, for waste management, while in the rest of the country, obligatory special inter-municipal association (on in each region) will deal with waste management.

 

Inter-municipal associations (“diadimotiki sindesmi”) can also be created on a voluntary basis, dealing with public works, service provision, fulfillment of concrete tasks or implementation of development programs and projects. The law is offering, furthermore, a wide range of contracting and networking possibilities both to municipalities and regions. Municipalities or/and regions can become parts of “contracts of inter-municipal or cross-level cooperation”, where one part can offer support to the other part or/and fulfill some of its tasks (Article 99 Kallikratis). Quite common are the so-called “programmatic contracts” (Article 100, “programmatikes simvasis”), concerning concrete projects (e.g. development projects, constructions etc.), where not only local authorities, but also other public authorities (also Universities) and public sector entities (public enterprises etc.) can become parts of.

 

Finally, municipalities and regions can also be members of looser co-operation schemes, such as “networks” (Art. 101, 202, 203 Kallikratis, “diktia”) following targets of public interest (including networks with foreign local governments).

 

An especially important role is played by the completely renovated associations of local authorities: Central Union of Municipalities in Greece (KEDE), the Regional Unions of Municipalities (PED) as well, for regions, by the Union of Greek Regions (ENPE) (see Law 3852/2010, article 282 and Presidential Decree 75/2011), although, as already said above (sub. art. 4), an adequate institutional consultation procedure of these association is not provided within the existing legal framework.

 

In conclusion, rapporteurs appreciate the multiplicity of instruments provided by the law. Considering also that no remarks or complaints on this issue have been submitted by the interlocutors during the meetings, rapporteurs consider that Article 10, paras. 1 and 3 of the Charter is fully respected in Greece. It should be pointed out that Greece is not bound by paragraph 2 of Article 10.

 

Nevertheless rapporteurs would like to point out that Greece has not yet signed the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning Euroregional Co-operation Groupings (ECGs) (CETS No. 206).

Article 10.2
Local authorities' right to associate - Non ratified

The entitlement of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection and promotion of their common interests and to belong to an international association of local authorities shall be recognised in each State.

Article 10.3
Local authorities' right to associate - Article ratified

Local authorities shall be entitled, under such conditions as may be provided for by the law, to co-operate with their counterparts in other States.

As for Article 10, para 3, of the Charter, first and second level local authorities may set up international and European collaborations under international, European Union and national law, according to the scope of their responsibilities and subject to the country’s international obligations, as follows: a) Municipalities and regions collaborate with respective foreign authorities, at the European and international level, in order to facilitate and promote transnational, inter-regional, cross-border and territorial co-operation and participate in programmes, activities and initiatives of European (EU, etc.), international and regional organisations (Council of Europe, etc.); b) Municipalities may enter into twinning programmes with other cities with a view to promoting economic, cultural, educational and social relations and building and developing close and friendly relations; c) Municipalities, regions and de-concentrated administrations may participate in a European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC) in order to facilitate and promote cross-border, transnational and/or interregional co-operation with the exclusive aim of strengthening economic and social cohesion. A European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation with its headquarters in Greece is an urban non-profit company; d) Municipalities may organise cultural, artistic and sporting events and mission exchanges; e) Regions may cooperate with respective local authorities and other foreign organisations.

 

In conclusion, rapporteurs appreciate the multiplicity of instruments provided by the law. Considering also that no remarks or complaints on this issue have been submitted by the interlocutors during the meetings, rapporteurs consider that Article 10, paras. 1 and 3 of the Charter is fully respected in Greece. It should be pointed out that Greece is not bound by paragraph 2 of Article 10. 

Article 11
Legal protection of local selfgovernment - Article ratified

Local authorities shall have the right of recourse to a judicial remedy in order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles of local self-government as are enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation.

Concerning the protection of local self-government, as public law entities, local authorities have all the substantial and procedural rights which apply to such entities, while they furthermore can refer to fundamental rights applicable to private entities, whenever their private property rights are concerned.

 

However, the rapporteurs would like to point out that Greece lacks a constitutional court and in particular a special remedy for local authorities is not foreseen by law. The lack of these remedies can entail a weakening of constitutional and legal protection of local self-government as far as legislation is involved.

 

For executive acts, Article 95 para. 1, letter a) of the Constitution establishes the direct and centralised jurisdiction of the Council of State (Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας, Symvoulio Epikratias”, the supreme administrative court), “to annul upon petition enforceable acts of administrative authorities for excess of power or violations of law”. Municipalities and regions can challenge administrative acts infringing their administrative and financial autonomy. The Third Chamber of the Council of State has jurisdiction over such applications. If the Chamber holds unconstitutional a legal provision, it is obliged to refer the matter to the Plenum.

 

As far as legislation is concerned, a diffuse system of judicial review exists. Thus, the question of constitutionality can be addressed by any court, and local authorities can invoke their constitutional and further legal status, whenever they appeal against State decisions (e.g. decision of State supervision authorities, the Court of Audit, or if they appeal against court decisions at a higher court). Notwithstanding this diffuse system, several factors – the availability of legal remedies against judicial decisions, the lower courts’ standard practice of following the pronouncements of the high courts, the possibility to directly challenge executive acts before the Council of State – pushed towards a “de facto” concentration of judicial review in the hands of the Council of State (at least as far as administrative matters are concerned. For civil and criminal matters this tendency is in favour of the Supreme Court. Whenever their interpretations differ, a Special Highest Court shall be established, according to art. 100, para. 1, letter e) of the Constitution).

 

Legislative acts that include individual measures – and do not need any further executive act for their implementation – cannot be challenged in courts, thus bypassing both direct and diffuse judicial review. The Council of State’ has indicated that to enact regulations of an individual nature by statute in order to bypass direct judicial review is constitutionally permissible only in exceptional circumstances and is always subject to judicial scrutiny. However, many reforms of local government have been introduced by statutes that exhaustively provide all details and thus preclude any further executive regulations. Therefore, they cannot be challenged, neither directly, nor indirectly (by challenging the executive acts) by local authorities. 

 

In the light of the foregoing, the rapporteurs point out that the lack of any mechanism to directly challenge the constitutionality of legislative acts in the Greek system of judicial review results in a substantial gap in terms of legal protection of local self-government.

Article 12.1
Undertakings - Non ratified

Each Party undertakes to consider itself bound by at least twenty paragraphs of Part I of the Charter, at least ten of which shall be selected from among the following paragraphs:

 

– Article 2,

– Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2,

– Article 4, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4,

– Article 5,

– Article 7, paragraph 1,

– Article 8, paragraph 2,

– Article 9, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3,

– Article 10, paragraph 1,

– Article 11.

226. As noted above in various paragraphs, the Instrument of Ratification of the Charter by Greece was deposited on 6 September 1989. The Charter entered into force in respect of that country on 1 January 1990. On the ground of Article 12, paragraph 2 of the Charter, Greece declared itself not to be bound by: Article 5 Article 7, paragraph 2; Article 8, paragraph 2; Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Charter. 227. Moreover, while an explicit declaration according to Article 13 of the Charter is not included in the ratification instrument, as indicated above, Article 2 of Law 1850/1989 establishes that the implementation of the Charter is restricted to local authorities of the first tier. 228. In the written answers to the rapporteurs’ questions the Ministry of the Interior informed the rapporteurs that, for the time being, it is still not possible to ratify all the above mentioned provisions. The only provision on which the reservation could be lifted, according to the competent Directorate of the Ministry of Interior could be Article 8, para. 2, as control, which is strictly limited to their legality and not to their expediency, is exercised over local government actions. 229. Regarding the other provision, the Ministry of the Interior pointed out that: “- Art.5 Any change of the administrative boundaries of a municipality may take place under certain conditions provided for in articles 2-5 of the Law 3463/2006 (“Code of Municipalities and Communities”), Articles 10-13 of the same law, and Article 5 (redefinition of boundaries of municipal communities within municipalities of over 100.000 inhabitants, transfer of a local community to a neighbouring municipality) and Article 6 (establishment of a local community from a settlement which is defined in the census as independent) of Law 3852/2010 (“the Kallikratis reform”), with different regulatory acts, as the case may be, and based on the opinion of the local authorities involved. Holding local referendums is provided for in Article 216 of Law 3463/2006; however, in practice, referendums have not been held, pending the issuance of a Presidential Decree, which will provide for legality and other organisational issues; - Article 7, par.2: The Law 3852/2010 (article 92 in relation to municipalities and article 181 in relation to regions) and provisions which settle specific issues are mainly issued on the initiative of the Ministries of Finance and of Labour. Α payment is provided for the heads of the regions, the deputy heads of the regions, the mayors and the deputy mayors, as well as representation allowances are provided for the presidents of local and municipal communities. However, such payments or allowances are not provided for the municipal or the regional councillors. For any loss of profit or fees in respect of services provided, court action should be taken; […] - Article 10, par 2: The possibilities for municipal authorities to engage in international co-operation are provided for in Articles 219-221 of Law 3463/2006 and in Articles 99-101 (inter-municipal or intra-level cooperation, contract plans, and networks of municipalities and of regions) of law 3852/2010. Articles 202 (networks) and 203 (international co-operation at the regional level) of the same law provide for such cooperation possibilities especially for the regions. However, at both tiers of local government , networks are set up in Greece in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code (obligatory establishment of a non-profit partnership under civil law ) while any kind of international co-operation is subject to the approval of the special inter- ministerial committee in accordance with law 3345/2005. This special committee is set up on a joint decision of the Ministers of Interior and of Foreign Affairs. Concerning the collective organs of the two tiers of local government, respective international co-operation possibilities are also provided, without the terms provided for in Law 3345/2005 (Article 2 of the Presidential Decree 74/2011 on the Union of Regions and article 1 of the Presidential Decree 75/2011 on the Regional Unions of Municipalities and the Central Union of Municipalities of Greece).” 230. The Ministry confirmed as well that “in relation to Recommendation 247 (2008) and the ratification of the Charter of Local Self-Government, we note that according to Article 2 of Law 1850/1989, the scope of the Charter does not concern the second tier of local government.” 231. In consequence, this report would recommend the Greek authorities to consider revisiting the advisability of reviewing some of the declarations made at the time of ratification. For instance, the withdrawal of the declaration made in connection with Article 5 and Article 8, para. 2 of the Charter should not represent a serious problem. 232. In addition, the rapporteurs recommend the Greek authorities to extend the scope of the Charter to the second tier of local government (regions) as after the Kallikratis reform no doubts remain on their nature of self-government authorities, as we will point out below.

Article 12.2
Undertakings - Non ratified

Each Contracting State, when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, shall notify to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the paragraphs selected in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

226. As noted above in various paragraphs, the Instrument of Ratification of the Charter by Greece was deposited on 6 September 1989. The Charter entered into force in respect of that country on 1 January 1990. On the ground of Article 12, paragraph 2 of the Charter, Greece declared itself not to be bound by: Article 5 Article 7, paragraph 2; Article 8, paragraph 2; Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Charter. 227. Moreover, while an explicit declaration according to Article 13 of the Charter is not included in the ratification instrument, as indicated above, Article 2 of Law 1850/1989 establishes that the implementation of the Charter is restricted to local authorities of the first tier. 228. In the written answers to the rapporteurs’ questions the Ministry of the Interior informed the rapporteurs that, for the time being, it is still not possible to ratify all the above mentioned provisions. The only provision on which the reservation could be lifted, according to the competent Directorate of the Ministry of Interior could be Article 8, para. 2, as control, which is strictly limited to their legality and not to their expediency, is exercised over local government actions. 229. Regarding the other provision, the Ministry of the Interior pointed out that: “- Art.5 Any change of the administrative boundaries of a municipality may take place under certain conditions provided for in articles 2-5 of the Law 3463/2006 (“Code of Municipalities and Communities”), Articles 10-13 of the same law, and Article 5 (redefinition of boundaries of municipal communities within municipalities of over 100.000 inhabitants, transfer of a local community to a neighbouring municipality) and Article 6 (establishment of a local community from a settlement which is defined in the census as independent) of Law 3852/2010 (“the Kallikratis reform”), with different regulatory acts, as the case may be, and based on the opinion of the local authorities involved. Holding local referendums is provided for in Article 216 of Law 3463/2006; however, in practice, referendums have not been held, pending the issuance of a Presidential Decree, which will provide for legality and other organisational issues; - Article 7, par.2: The Law 3852/2010 (article 92 in relation to municipalities and article 181 in relation to regions) and provisions which settle specific issues are mainly issued on the initiative of the Ministries of Finance and of Labour. Α payment is provided for the heads of the regions, the deputy heads of the regions, the mayors and the deputy mayors, as well as representation allowances are provided for the presidents of local and municipal communities. However, such payments or allowances are not provided for the municipal or the regional councillors. For any loss of profit or fees in respect of services provided, court action should be taken; […] - Article 10, par 2: The possibilities for municipal authorities to engage in international co-operation are provided for in Articles 219-221 of Law 3463/2006 and in Articles 99-101 (inter-municipal or intra-level cooperation, contract plans, and networks of municipalities and of regions) of law 3852/2010. Articles 202 (networks) and 203 (international co-operation at the regional level) of the same law provide for such cooperation possibilities especially for the regions. However, at both tiers of local government , networks are set up in Greece in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code (obligatory establishment of a non-profit partnership under civil law ) while any kind of international co-operation is subject to the approval of the special inter- ministerial committee in accordance with law 3345/2005. This special committee is set up on a joint decision of the Ministers of Interior and of Foreign Affairs. Concerning the collective organs of the two tiers of local government, respective international co-operation possibilities are also provided, without the terms provided for in Law 3345/2005 (Article 2 of the Presidential Decree 74/2011 on the Union of Regions and article 1 of the Presidential Decree 75/2011 on the Regional Unions of Municipalities and the Central Union of Municipalities of Greece).” 230. The Ministry confirmed as well that “in relation to Recommendation 247 (2008) and the ratification of the Charter of Local Self-Government, we note that according to Article 2 of Law 1850/1989, the scope of the Charter does not concern the second tier of local government.” 231. In consequence, this report would recommend the Greek authorities to consider revisiting the advisability of reviewing some of the declarations made at the time of ratification. For instance, the withdrawal of the declaration made in connection with Article 5 and Article 8, para. 2 of the Charter should not represent a serious problem. 232. In addition, the rapporteurs recommend the Greek authorities to extend the scope of the Charter to the second tier of local government (regions) as after the Kallikratis reform no doubts remain on their nature of self-government authorities, as we will point out below.

Article 12.3
Undertakings - Non ratified

Any Party may, at any later time, notify the Secretary General that it considers itself bound by any paragraphs of this Charter which it has not already accepted under the terms of paragraph 1 of this article. Such undertakings subsequently given shall be deemed to be an integral part of the ratification, acceptance or approval of the Party so notifying, and shall have the same effect as from the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of the receipt of the notification by the Secretary General.

226. As noted above in various paragraphs, the Instrument of Ratification of the Charter by Greece was deposited on 6 September 1989. The Charter entered into force in respect of that country on 1 January 1990. On the ground of Article 12, paragraph 2 of the Charter, Greece declared itself not to be bound by: Article 5 Article 7, paragraph 2; Article 8, paragraph 2; Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Charter. 227. Moreover, while an explicit declaration according to Article 13 of the Charter is not included in the ratification instrument, as indicated above, Article 2 of Law 1850/1989 establishes that the implementation of the Charter is restricted to local authorities of the first tier. 228. In the written answers to the rapporteurs’ questions the Ministry of the Interior informed the rapporteurs that, for the time being, it is still not possible to ratify all the above mentioned provisions. The only provision on which the reservation could be lifted, according to the competent Directorate of the Ministry of Interior could be Article 8, para. 2, as control, which is strictly limited to their legality and not to their expediency, is exercised over local government actions. 229. Regarding the other provision, the Ministry of the Interior pointed out that: “- Art.5 Any change of the administrative boundaries of a municipality may take place under certain conditions provided for in articles 2-5 of the Law 3463/2006 (“Code of Municipalities and Communities”), Articles 10-13 of the same law, and Article 5 (redefinition of boundaries of municipal communities within municipalities of over 100.000 inhabitants, transfer of a local community to a neighbouring municipality) and Article 6 (establishment of a local community from a settlement which is defined in the census as independent) of Law 3852/2010 (“the Kallikratis reform”), with different regulatory acts, as the case may be, and based on the opinion of the local authorities involved. Holding local referendums is provided for in Article 216 of Law 3463/2006; however, in practice, referendums have not been held, pending the issuance of a Presidential Decree, which will provide for legality and other organisational issues; - Article 7, par.2: The Law 3852/2010 (article 92 in relation to municipalities and article 181 in relation to regions) and provisions which settle specific issues are mainly issued on the initiative of the Ministries of Finance and of Labour. Α payment is provided for the heads of the regions, the deputy heads of the regions, the mayors and the deputy mayors, as well as representation allowances are provided for the presidents of local and municipal communities. However, such payments or allowances are not provided for the municipal or the regional councillors. For any loss of profit or fees in respect of services provided, court action should be taken; […] - Article 10, par 2: The possibilities for municipal authorities to engage in international co-operation are provided for in Articles 219-221 of Law 3463/2006 and in Articles 99-101 (inter-municipal or intra-level cooperation, contract plans, and networks of municipalities and of regions) of law 3852/2010. Articles 202 (networks) and 203 (international co-operation at the regional level) of the same law provide for such cooperation possibilities especially for the regions. However, at both tiers of local government , networks are set up in Greece in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code (obligatory establishment of a non-profit partnership under civil law ) while any kind of international co-operation is subject to the approval of the special inter- ministerial committee in accordance with law 3345/2005. This special committee is set up on a joint decision of the Ministers of Interior and of Foreign Affairs. Concerning the collective organs of the two tiers of local government, respective international co-operation possibilities are also provided, without the terms provided for in Law 3345/2005 (Article 2 of the Presidential Decree 74/2011 on the Union of Regions and article 1 of the Presidential Decree 75/2011 on the Regional Unions of Municipalities and the Central Union of Municipalities of Greece).” 230. The Ministry confirmed as well that “in relation to Recommendation 247 (2008) and the ratification of the Charter of Local Self-Government, we note that according to Article 2 of Law 1850/1989, the scope of the Charter does not concern the second tier of local government.” 231. In consequence, this report would recommend the Greek authorities to consider revisiting the advisability of reviewing some of the declarations made at the time of ratification. For instance, the withdrawal of the declaration made in connection with Article 5 and Article 8, para. 2 of the Charter should not represent a serious problem. 232. In addition, the rapporteurs recommend the Greek authorities to extend the scope of the Charter to the second tier of local government (regions) as after the Kallikratis reform no doubts remain on their nature of self-government authorities, as we will point out below.

ACCESSION

to the Council of Europe 9 August 1949

RATIFICATION

of the European Charter of Local Self-Government 6 September 1989

CONSTITUTION | NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Consistently with the Greek tradition of centralisation, the principle of local self-government is not included among the “Basic Provisions” of Part One of the Constitution.



26Ratified provision(s)
0Provision(s) with reservation(s)
7 Non ratified articles
10Compliant Provision(s)
2Partially Compliant Articles
14Non-compliant Provision(s)